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Abstract: 
On 22 January 2001, the UK became the first country to approve of embryonic 
stem cell research by passing the Human Fertilisation (Research Purposes) 
Regulations 2001, which legislated new research purposes for which early 
embryos can be used in addition to those approved by the Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Act 1990. Legal advisory committees, most notably the Chief 
                                                          
1
 I am grateful for helpful criticisms on a previous draft by Derek Bell, Stephen Clark, and two 
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Medical Officer’s Expert Group and the House of Lords’ Select Committee, 
have offered various reasons, which can also be found in the ethics literature, 
to justify this change. Those examined here are the views that: 1. early 
embryos lack relevant qualities (or ‘the argument from lack of qualities’) and 
2. early embryos only have a potentiality to become humans with moral status 
(or ‘the argument from potentiality’). The validity of these arguments is 
questioned and a case is made for egalitarian speciesism. Embryos have moral 
status (used here in the restricted sense of the status possessed by all members 
of the class of beings which deserve the greatest moral significance in equal 
measure). They have more value than the value that should be assigned to 
nonhuman beings from the start of fertilisation. Current UK legislation on 
embryo research is immoral. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
On 22 January 2001, the UK changed its legal position on embryo research by 
passing the Human Fertilisation (Research Purposes) Regulations 2001.2 It 
became the first country to approve of embryonic stem cell research and 
                                                                                                                                                        
anonymous reviewers. 
2
 The term ‘embryo’ will be used to refer to the ‘human embryo’ and to refer to early human 
lives from the beginning of fertilisation onwards until the eighth week of development. The 
term ‘early embryo’ will be used to refer to any embryo below the age of fourteen days.  
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‘therapeutic cloning’. Two legal advisory committees have been most directly 
involved with this change: the Chief Medical Officer’s Expert Group (charged 
by the UK Government with assessing the anticipated benefits, risks, and 
alternatives of new areas of research using embryos) and the House of Lords’ 
Select Committee (appointed to consider and report on the issues connected 
with stem cell research and human cloning arising from the new Regulations). 
Within their reports, several arguments can be found aimed at justifying the 
position that the value of the early embryo can be outweighed by research. 
Two of these arguments will be challenged here: 1. early embryos lack 
relevant qualities (the argument from lack of qualities); 2. early embryos only 
have a potentiality to become humans with moral status (the argument from 
potentiality). These arguments will be considered within the wider ethics 
literature. I shall argue that the present legal situation cannot justifiably be 
maintained, and propose a case for egalitarian speciesism. This is the view that 
all members of the human species have ‘moral status’ because of their species 
membership, and that they have more value than the value that should be 
ascribed to members of other species. The notion of ‘moral status’ refers here 
to the status possessed by every member within the class of beings which 
deserve the greatest degree of respect in equal measure. Embryos attain such 
status from the start of fertilisation, that is: before their genetic identity has 
been created.  
 
 4
THE LEGAL SITUATION 
 
The Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Research Purposes) Regulations 
came into force in the UK in early 2001, adding new purposes for which 
embryos can be used for research, aimed mainly at the development of 
treatments for ‘serious disease’.3 This includes the growing field of stem cell 
research, which may involve ‘therapeutic cloning’ or the creation of embryos 
by somatic cell nuclear transfer. Apart from the stress on tackling ‘serious 
disease’, the new Regulations do not provide further justification for why the 
decision to extend the purposes for which embryos can be used was made. The 
reason why less serious disease would not fall within the remit of what is 
legally acceptable is also left unexplained. Further justification, however, can 
be found in the Chief Medical Officer’s Expert Group’s Report with the title 
‘Stem Cell Research: Medical Progress with Responsibility’, the conclusions 
of which have been embraced by the Government and by the new 
Regulations.4 It states that embryonic stem cell research may proceed because 
                                                          
3
 Statutory Instrument 2001 No. 188. The Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Research 
Purposes) Regulations 2001. Norwich. The Stationery Office Limited. 
4
 Chief Medical Officer’s Expert Group (Reviewing the Potential of Developments in Stem 
Cell Research and Cell Nuclear Replacement to Benefit Human Health). 2000. Stem Cell 
Research: Medical Progress with Responsibility. London: Department of Health; Department 
of Health. 2000. Government Response to the Recommendations Made in the Chief Medical 
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of the ‘great potential to relieve suffering and treat disease’.5 More recently, 
this view was echoed in the House of Lords’ Select Committee’s Report with 
the title ‘Stem Cell Research. Report From the Select Committee’.6 Early 
embryos are deemed to lack moral status as their value can be outweighed by 
the pursuit to find cures for serious disease. This assumption is supported in a 
number of different ways, two of which will be scrutinised in this paper.  
  
EARLY EMBRYOS LACK RELEVANT QUALITIES (THE ARGUMENT 
FROM LACK OF QUALITIES) 
 
The argument from lack of qualities is the view that early embryos lack moral 
status as they lack the necessary qualities for having such status. Within these 
reports, these qualities are the capacities necessary for thought, action, 
communication, and sentience. I shall argue that attempts to understand the 
current UK legal stance in terms of the early embryo’s presumed lack of 
capacities for thought, action, and communication fail to explain and justify 
                                                                                                                                                        
Officer’s Expert Group Report ‘Stem Cell Research: Medical Progress with Responsibility’. 
Norwich. The Stationery Office Limited. 
5
 Chief Medical Officer’s Expert Group. Stem Cell Research: Executive Summary: conclusion 
no 24-25 and recommendation no 1. 
6
 House of Lords. 2002. Stem Cell Research. Report From the Select Committee. Published by 
Authority of the House of Lords. London. The Stationery Office Limited: section 4.21 and 
recommendation no 7.  
 6
the legal situation adequately, and that the historical context in which these 
documents are situated reveals the importance of sentience. However, as an 
elaborate argument for the importance of this quality is missing, I shall also 
examine the position of Bonnie Steinbock, who has recently defended the 
moral relevance of sentience in the context of discussing embryo research, 
arriving at conclusions very similar to these reports’.  
  The House of Lords’ Select Committee claims that ‘the basic arguments for 
respect are focused on (…) beings able to think, act, and communicate’.7 There 
are three problems with this view. Firstly, one could question if infants possess 
these capacities, which is what the Committee in fact does.8 It explicitly states 
that ‘capacities to act are lacking (…) in infants’ and excludes infants from 
personhood (which is assigned to ‘beings able to think, act, and 
communicate’).9 The logical conclusion of such a position would be to allow 
for infanticide.10 My view is that such a restrictive view should not be 
                                                          
7
 House of Lords. Stem Cell Research: section 4.7. 
8
 An anonymous referee of an earlier version of this paper remarked correctly that infant 
thought, action, and communication cannot be ruled out with certainty. 
9
 House of Lords. Stem Cell Research: section 4.7. 
10
 See for example M. Tooley. 1998. In Defense of Abortion and Infanticide. In The Abortion 
Controversy. 25 Years After Roe v. Wade. A Reader. Pojman and Beckwith, ed. Second 
Edition. Belmont. Wadsworth:209-233:231: Infanticide is defended on the basis that an infant 
may not be ‘capable of possessing the concept of a continuing subject of experiences and other 
mental states’. 
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accepted. Infanticide is rightly outlawed. On this point, the Committee agrees, 
arguing that respect is rightly ‘extended’ to infants.11 Yet this raises the 
question of why the Committee dismisses considering such an extension to 
early embryos. Secondly, as some nonhumans may possess qualities enabling 
them to ‘think, act, and communicate’, the logical conclusion would be that 
they should be ascribed more value than human infants. In the final section, I 
shall argue that this conclusion is unacceptable. Thirdly, as not only embryos 
below the age of fourteen days, but also older embryos fail to ‘think, act, and 
communicate’ according to the Committee, the logical conclusion would be to 
allow for research on all embryos. Hence, the argument fails to establish why 
the Committee supports the legally imposed fourteen day limit. This implies 
that its ultimate justification for denying moral status to early embryos must lie 
elsewhere.  
  A clue for where this might be is provided when the Committee writes that 
the fourteen day limit for research ‘has an objective justification insofar as it 
represents the stage at which the primitive streak, the precursor of the 
development of the nervous system, begins to appear’, a stage before which (as 
claimed in a preceding section) ‘there can be no sentience’.12 The view that 
                                                          
11
 House of Lords. Stem Cell Research: section 4.7. 
12
 House of Lords. Stem Cell Research: section 4.22 and 4.2 (d); Other reasons that are 
provided for the relevance of the appearance of the primitive streak are that it would mark the 
start of the embryo’s individuality and the start of a continuity in the embryo’s identity. These 
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early embryos do not have moral status because they lack the quality of 
sentience is more widely accepted than the view that they lack such status on 
the basis of their inability to ‘think, act, and communicate’. Even though the 
Chief Medical Officer’s Expert Group does not specify which characteristics 
embryos should possess in order to have moral status, it is likely that also for 
this Group the presumed absence of sentience may have influenced its opinion 
that early embryos do not have such status. The gradualist position which is 
adopted, or the view that the ‘respect owed to developing human life is 
regarded as increasing in proportion to the degree of development of the 
embryo’, suggests that the early embryo’s presumed lack of sentience 
contributes at least partly to her or his relatively undeveloped stage.13 This 
interpretation gains force because of the Group’s stated intention not to revisit 
the issues discussed by the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology (better known as the Warnock Committee).14 While the ultimate 
justification for the Warnock Committee’s support of embryo research is 
unclear, its Report suggests the relevance of the view that ‘the embryo is 
incapable of feeling pain’.15 This interpretation is supported by Mary 
                                                                                                                                                        
are addressed extensively in my ‘Why Eberl is Wrong’. Unpublished manuscript under review 
by Bioethics.  
13
 Chief Medical Officer’s Expert Group. Stem Cell Research: section 4.2. 
14
 M. Warnock. 1985. A Question of Life. The Warnock Report on Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology. Oxford. Blackwell. 
15
 Warnock. A Question of Life:65 (paragraph 11.20). 
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Warnock’s introduction to her publication of this Report, where she identifies 
the absence of ‘pain to the embryo’ as a contributing factor to the majority’s 
support for embryo research.16  
  Because of the legal attention which sentience has enjoyed as a quality for 
deciding moral considerability, I shall discuss the position of Bonnie 
Steinbock, one of the most prominent ethicists who has proposed such a view 
in the context of recent debate on embryo research. Her account will be 
evaluated as a putative defence of current UK legislation. An important 
difference, however, is that Steinbock’s account would justify research on 
embryos over the age of fourteen days, given her claim that embryos are 
insentient at least up to the age of twelve weeks (and, perhaps, even up to 
twenty to twenty-four weeks).17 Steinbock is an exponent of what she calls the 
‘interest view’ or the view that only beings that have interests ‘count morally’, 
and that only sentient beings (that is, beings with the capacity to experience 
pain or pleasure) have interests.18 Steinbock writes that her interest view does 
                                                          
16
 Warnock. A Question of Life:xv. 
17
 B. Steinbock. 2001. Respect for Human Embryos. In Cloning and the Future of Human 
Embryo Research. Lauritzen, ed. Oxford. Oxford University Press:21-33:26; B. Steinbock. 
1999. Why Most Abortions Are Not Wrong. In Bioethics for Medical Education. (Advances in 
Bioethics:5) Edwards and Bittar, eds. Stamford, Connecticut. Jai Press:245-267:247-249. 
18
 Steinbock. Respect for Human Embryos:23; B. Steinbock. 1996. Life Before Birth. The 
Moral and Legal Status of Embryos and Fetuses. New York/Oxford. Oxford University 
Press:5,9. 
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not imply that one is therefore allowed to treat embryos in whichever way one 
pleases. Early gestation fetuses can only be aborted for good reasons, ‘such as 
not wanting to bear a child’, and not all forms of embryo research should be 
allowed.19 She argues that, just as one should have respect for dead bodies, so 
one should also have a certain respect for embryos, even though both dead 
bodies and embryos are without moral status.20 As symbols of human life, 
embryos are claimed to have symbolic value. Hence, Steinbock does not 
support what she calls ‘frivolous or trivial’ research on embryos, arguing that 
it ‘should be limited to research likely to result in significant benefit to people, 
as only such research demonstrates respect’.21 This is on a par with the notion 
of ‘serious disease’ in the Human Fertilisation (Research Purposes) 
Regulations 2001 and the Chief Medical Officer’s Expert Group’s view that 
‘the benefits of the proposed research’ must be ‘weighed against the respect 
due to the embryo’.22 What is unlikely to result in significant benefits must be 
prohibited as such research fails to show respect. 
  A number of objections can be raised against Steinbock’s account. Firstly, 
even if early embryos lack the capacity to feel pain, it is not clear why this 
should imply that they lack moral status. Some people with rare forms of 
                                                          
19
 Steinbock. Why Most Abortions Are Not Wrong:249. 
20
 Steinbock. Respect for Human Embryos:29. 
21
 Steinbock. Respect for Human Embryos:30. 
 11
disease, people in comatose states, and people under the influence of 
anaesthetics may also lack the capacity to feel pain. Yet it is clearly not right to 
conclude that they therefore lack moral status. Steinbock recognises this, but 
states that while a temporarily unconscious person may have a desire not to be 
killed that has been expressed in the past, insentient fetuses cannot be said to 
have this desire.23 Steinbock either abandons or supplements her earlier 
defence of hedonic utilitarianism here as this statement implies that it is no 
longer (merely) the capacity to feel pain that determines whether or not one 
has moral status. Instead, she suggests that the reason why we should not kill 
people resides in their having a desire not to be killed. In other words, 
Steinbock adopts preference utilitarianism here. The House of Lords’ Select 
Committee’s position that respect befalls ‘beings able to think (…) and 
communicate’ may perhaps be understood in terms of a capacity to form or 
state preferences.24 Since embryos do not have preferences enabling them to 
take an interest in life, killing them would be fairly unproblematic. Steinbock 
acknowledges, however, that some things may be in our interest, even if we 
are not interested in them or take an interest in them (e.g. ‘foregoing tobacco’), 
and then examines whether or not we should assume that life is in the interest 
                                                                                                                                                        
22
 Chief Medical Officer’s Expert Group. Stem Cell Research: Executive Summary: 
Conclusion no 17. 
23
 Steinbock. Why Most Abortions Are Not Wrong:252. 
24
 House of Lords. Stem Cell Research: section 4.7. 
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of embryos.25 She concludes that embryos cannot have an interest in life as 
only sentient beings can have interests: ‘A nonsentient fetus cannot be said to 
want anything, and so cannot be said to want not to be killed’.26 Only beings 
that actually can be said to have preferences or that have stated them in the 
past would have an interest in life. The problem with this view is that it is by 
no means straightforward that sentient fetuses have preferences. The presence 
of sentience as such may not warrant the conclusion that they have a 
preference in the avoidance of pain. Even if we grant that the latter is implied 
by the former, killing anaesthetised fetuses would still be allowed, unless it 
could be argued that once the fetus becomes sentient he or she also gains 
preferences other than the preference to avoid pain. Steinbock provides no 
such argument. Instead, she tries to justify the difference between insentient 
and sentient fetuses by claiming that only the latter have a biographical life, for 
which the memory of past experiences would be essential. Faced with the 
possible objection that ‘most people have very few memories about anything 
that occurred before the ages of four or five’, she replies that ‘most of us are 
convinced that we are the same individuals we were when very young’.27 
Steinbock recognises the weakness of her account, yet fails to develop ‘a more 
                                                          
25
 Steinbock. Why Most Abortions Are Not Wrong:252-253. 
26
 Steinbock. Why Most Abortions Are Not Wrong:252. 
27
 Steinbock. Why Most Abortions Are Not Wrong:253. 
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(…) sophisticated’ account that is ‘not entirely dependent on memory’.28 At 
the same time, she insists that a biological continuity account is insufficient as 
she claims that it would lead to the absurd and unacceptable conclusion that 
contraception is as problematic as abortion, given that the physical history of 
the embryo goes back to the gametes which formed him or her.29 Steinbock 
fails to see that the physical continuity which exists between an embryo and an 
adult is different in kind from the physical continuity which exists between an 
adult and the gametes which conjoined to originate her or him, and that this 
difference is morally significant. This point will be developed in the following 
section, where I argue that Steinbock fails to distinguish between active and 
passive potentiality. 
  Secondly, Steinbock’s concession that ‘getting enough sleep, eating 
moderately, and foregoing tobacco might be in the interest of a person who has 
no interest in following such a regime’ supports, in spite of her denial, the 
view that ‘beings incapable of taking an interest in anything (…) have a good 
of their own’.30 The fact that Steinbock lists these things, rather than others 
(e.g. eating plastic), indicates that she recognises that some things simply are 
in our interests, irrespective of whether or not we prefer things to be that way. 
The reason why foregoing tobacco is in the interest of adults is not because 
                                                          
28
 Steinbock. Why Most Abortions Are Not Wrong:254. 
29
 Steinbock. Why Most Abortions Are Not Wrong:254-255. 
30
 Steinbock. Why Most Abortions Are Not Wrong:252,263. 
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adults prefer things to be that way, but because it damages their health and 
may kill. This is why embryos also benefit from avoiding tobacco, and the 
question of whether or not embryos can prefer to avoid tobacco is simply 
irrelevant. Steinbock shows some awareness here of the problems of 
preference utilitarianism, yet fails to abandon it. In the final section, I shall 
return to this issue, arguing that embryos, even if it is granted that they may 
not be able to take an interest in life, have an interest in life. 
  Thirdly, the advisory bodies supporting present UK law claim, as Steinbock 
does, that the embryo is worthy of some respect.31 Yet as no positive account 
of what such respect is based on is provided, one is left wondering if this 
implies tacit acceptance of Steinbock’s claim that ‘while early abortion is not 
the psychological equivalent of contraception, it is morally closer to 
contraception than to homicide’.32 What they fail to see is that, if there is 
hardly any difference between gametes and embryos, their concern about 
frivolous or trivial research must be accompanied by a similar concern for the 
loss of sperm in frivolous sexual play. Their lack of concern for gametes 
(which could also be regarded as symbols of life) shows that their position is 
inconsistent. Their focus on the qualities which are lacking in embryos 
obscures what positively distinguishes them from gametes. 
                                                          
31
 Chief Medical Officer’s Expert Group. Stem Cell Research: section 4.26; House of Lords. 
Stem Cell Research: section 4.23.  
32
 Steinbock. Why Most Abortions Are Not Wrong:248. 
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  Fourthly, and related to the previous point, the question could be asked if one 
can really demonstrate respect for embryos by limiting research to that which 
is claimed to have the potential to yield great benefits. One could defend this 
view by employing the arguments put forward by Michael Meyer and 
Lawrence Nelson, who draw on the work of Mary Anne Warren to assess the 
respect due to the embryo. Warren’s position is that the moral value of 
embryos is weak, as she claims that entities with moral agency, sentience, and 
ecological significance have more moral value than entities which lack one, 
two, or all three.33 On this basis, Meyer and Nelson argue that an attitude of 
respect can be compatible with destroying what one respects, an example 
being the Japanese practice of ‘mizuko kuyo’ in which women perform a 
number of rituals to commemorate their aborted fetuses.34 The problem with 
this view is that it is difficult to see how respect - the first meaning of which is 
‘deferential esteem (…) towards a person or quality’ according to the Oxford 
Encyclopedic English Dictionary - can be demonstrated by destroying 
embryos.35 Extraordinary circumstances left aside, the act of killing does not 
                                                          
33
 M. Meyer and L. Nelson. Respecting What We Destroy. Reflections on Human Embryo 
Research. Hastings Center Report 2001;31 (1):16-23:17: Reference is made to M.A. Warren. 
1997. Moral Status: Obligations to Persons and Other Living Things. Oxford. Oxford 
University Press:148-177. 
34
 Meyer and Nelson. Respecting What We Destroy:19. 
35
 J.M. Hawkins, R. Allen. ed. 1991. Oxford Encyclopedic English Dictionary. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press:1230. 
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seem to show respect for the person killed. A similar critique has been 
developed by Hugh McLachlan with regard to the Warnock Report’s view that 
the embryo should be granted some respect and some ‘protection in law’ 
which is followed by the suggestion that ex utero embryos should not be kept 
alive ‘beyond fourteen days after fertilisation’.36 McLachlan comments: ‘This 
is a bizarre way to ‘protect’ the embryo! The embryo (…) must be killed. I 
hope that Warnock and her committee do not try to ‘protect’ me and my family 
if this is an indication of what their protection can involve.’37 Together with 
the legal (advisory) documents discussed here, Steinbock’s response is that 
two necessary conditions for respectful research are that the researchers aim to 
tackle serious disease and that the donors give informed consent.38 Daniel 
Callahan, however, has criticised this approach: ‘It seems to me simply 
cosmetic ethics to use the language of respect, a sort of ‘to those we are about 
to destroy, we salute you’ gesture. It is a respect of no value whatsoever to the 
embryos, and serves only to make the embryo donors and the researchers feel 
                                                          
36
 H. McLachlan. Persons and Their Bodies: How We Should Think About Human Embryos. 
Health Care Analysis 2002;10:155-164:158; Warnock. A Question of Life:62-63,66 
(paragraphs 11.15,11.17,11.22). 
37
 McLachlan. Persons and Their Bodies:158. 
38
 Steinbock. Respect for Human Embryos:30,32; Chief Medical Officer’s Expert Group. Stem 
Cell Research: section 4.29 and Conclusions and Recommendations number 26; House of 
Lords. Stem Cell Research: section 4.25 a) and b): The Committee also expresses concern 
about the notion of ‘serious disease’ being undefined by the Regulations (sections 8.7 and 8.8). 
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better.’39 Of course, one could argue that making the researchers and donors 
feel better is important. By analogy, it could be argued that the way in which 
human corpses are treated is of no value to them, yet this does not make the 
way in which they are treated irrelevant. This is why we allow dissections only 
for good reasons, not for fun.40 Can we respect corpses? Perhaps we can, but it 
may be more appropriate to say that such respect benefits the survivors. Can 
embryos be respected while being destroyed for research? It seems more 
appropriate to say that those who could benefit from their destruction rather 
than the embryos themselves are respected. 
  I conclude that attempts to ground the UK legislation’s assumption that the 
early embryo lacks moral status on her or his presumed inability to think, act, 
communicate, feel pain, or have preferences, fail. One could argue that a 
quality other than those listed here is lacking in the early embryo and that he or 
she therefore lacks moral status. However, in the final section, I question the 
validity of any argument from lack of qualities and argue for the position that 
embryos have moral status. If they have such status, it seems implausible that 
embryos can be respected while being destroyed for research purposes. 
 
                                                          
39
 D. Callahan. Human Embryo Research: Respecting What We Destroy?. Hastings Center 
Report 2001;31 (4):4. 
40
 I owe this point to an anonymous referee of an earlier version of this paper. 
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EARLY EMBRYOS ONLY HAVE A POTENTIALITY TO BECOME 
HUMANS WITH MORAL STATUS (THE ARGUMENT FROM 
POTENTIALITY) 
 
The argument from potentiality is the claim that the early embryo does not 
possess moral status, but only has a potentiality to become a human with moral 
status. This claim is developed in four different ways by the legal advisory 
documents discussed here: firstly, the early embryo is potentially human; 
secondly, the early embryo is a potential human individual; thirdly, the early 
embryo has a passive potentiality to become a human with moral status; and 
fourthly, the early embryo has an active potentiality to become a human with 
moral status.  
  The first view may underpin the Chief Medical Officer’s Expert Group’s 
statement that the early embryo ‘could develop into a human being’ or is ‘a 
potential human being’ (although this may also be representative of the second 
view).41 It is clearly present in the House of Lords’ Select Committee’s 
statement that early embryos have ‘no trace of human structure such as a 
nervous system’.42 Clearly, this view cannot be maintained. It is entirely 
                                                          
41
 Chief Medical Officer’s Expert Group. Stem Cell Research: section 4.17 and Executive 
Summary conclusion no 26. 
42
 House of Lords. Stem Cell Research: section 4.2(d). 
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natural for humans to start life without the presence of a nervous system. 
Lacking a nervous system does not make one nonhuman. 
  The second view, that the early embryo is a potential human individual, puts 
the emphasis on the word ‘individual’, rather than on ‘human’. The facts that 
the early embryo may still be divisible and that his or her cells may be 
totipotent and undifferentiated are held to imply that she or he lacks 
individuality. I have addressed this view elsewhere, where I argue that neither 
divisibility nor totipotency preclude individuality, and that there are scientific 
reasons for holding that the early embryo is an individual.43  
  The third view is the view that the early embryo only has a passive 
potentiality to become a human with moral status. This view is present in the 
following passage from the House of Lords’ Select Committee’s Report: 
‘Although the fertilised egg and blastocyst contain all the genetic signals 
required for human life, this is true of nearly all cells in the body. However, 
genetic elements are not sufficient and there is no automatic programme of 
development from blastocyst to birth. Although the early embryo contains 
within it the full genetic potential of any person(s) who may develop from it, it 
requires many other factors, particularly those provided by the maternal 
environment in the womb, to enable it to realise that potential.’44 In an age of 
cloning by somatic cell nuclear transfer, the suggestion that this potential is 
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 See note 12. 
44
 House of Lords. Stem Cell Research: section 4.12. 
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present in ‘nearly all cells in the body’ could, indeed, underline the absurdity 
of claiming that early embryos have moral status. This point was made orally 
by Onora O’Neill in the 13 November 2001 House of Lords’ Select 
Committee’s meeting at the University of Durham.45 The problem with this 
view is that the difference between embryos and somatic cells is downplayed 
by the underlying assumption of a particular kind of genetic reductionism 
which regards embryos as virtually identical with the genes that compose 
them. Yet in spite of the House of Lords’ Select Committee’s appeal to 
‘embryological evidence’, presenting the embryo’s development in terms of an 
interaction between genes and maternal environment is embryologically 
deficient as it assumes that what occurs at the level of the embryo as a (cluster 
of) cell(s) is irrelevant for understanding the embryo’s development.46 This 
deficiency becomes apparent when we observe that somatic cells do not 
develop into children when they are placed in the same maternal environment 
(as the one in which embryos develop). The problem with this view is that the 
embryo’s potentiality is misconceived. Massimo Reichlin has pointed out 
                                                          
45
 See also L. Pojman. 1998. Abortion. A Defense of the Personhood Argument. In The 
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rightly that there is an important difference between passive potentiality (or 
potentiality in the loose sense) and active potentiality, and that these two 
different kinds of potentiality are often mixed up in discussions about the 
status of the embryo.47 Human gametes (and, perhaps, the nuclei of human 
somatic cells combined with enucleated ova) can give rise to humans if they 
are brought together through decisions made by external types of agency, i.e. 
(normally) the agencies of the people they belong to. Each gamete has, at the 
most, a ‘passive potentiality’ to become a human being, as it does not have the 
capacity to develop itself into a human being, but merely a possibility to unite 
with another gamete to form a new individual. ‘Real’ or ‘active potentiality’, 
on the other hand, refers to an entity’s internal capacity to change and develop 
itself.48 The error consists in understanding the embryo’s potentiality in terms 
of a passive potentiality. The embryo’s development depends on his or her 
inherent teleology as he or she has an orientation towards growth from the 
moment the sperm interacts with the egg. Environmental factors are needed, 
for example the right maternal environment, but that is no different from the 
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way in which adults, for example, also rely on oxygen (amongst other things) 
in order to realise their potential. But what about an embryo created outside 
the body? In the context of discussing Reichlin’s ideas, Alta Charo has pointed 
out that the active potentiality of such an embryo may not extend for longer 
than one week as he or she needs external assistance to obtain the chance of 
developing into a baby, leading to the view that ‘because it is not a potential 
baby, it need not be treated with a degree of respect that forestalls destructive 
research’.49 It is clear, however, that Alta Charo misunderstands the point 
which Reichlin has tried to make. Even though both gametes and embryos 
need external assistance to develop into babies, only embryos have active 
potentialities. As long as they exist, however long or short and in whatever 
location they exist, they regulate themselves and direct their own development. 
Nothing other than death can remove their potentialities. 
  I now turn to the final view. One could take the preceding point on board but 
still argue that it does not make sense to ascribe moral status on the basis of 
active potentiality. Embryos could have an active potentiality to become 
humans with moral status, but not possess such status as yet. The House of 
Lords’ Select Committee argues this point in the following way: ‘A medical 
student is a potential physician, and if he or she qualifies may practise as such; 
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but the potentiality alone does not confer a right to practise.’50 In a similar 
vein, Louis Pojman has pointed out that a mere candidate for the presidency is 
not a president.51 These analogies are intended to suggest that, just as it does 
not make sense to ascribe the privileges enjoyed by either graduates or 
presidents to those who merely aspire to these states, it does not make sense to 
confer the status enjoyed by children or adults to striving embryos. What is 
conflated here is the embryo’s potentiality to develop into a child (or more 
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mature human being) and the embryo’s potentiality to develop into a being 
with moral status. These analogies are only relevant for those who have 
already decided that the embryo’s lack of maturity implies a lack of moral 
status. Yet this is by no means a straightforward implication. Does one’s lack 
of qualification as a physician or of being the president imply a lack of moral 
status? Not at all. The question of whether or not a particular human has moral 
status is immune from the question of whether or not that human has achieved 
a particular contingent status. Presidents and physicians, after all, do not have 
more moral value than anybody else. Then why should embryos be denied 
moral status because they are not babies yet? In the final section I argue that 
the embryo’s value is not diminished by the fact that she or he has not attained 
X or Y (any contingent human qualities) as yet, but that he or she has moral 
status because of his or her striving towards X or Y.  
  I have identified four different versions of the argument from potentiality that 
can be found in the legal advisory bodies’ documents discussed here: that early 
embryos are potentially human; that they are potential human individuals; that 
they have a passive potentiality to become humans with moral status; and that 
they have an active potentiality to become humans with moral status. I have 
argued that none of these are convincing. 
 
A CASE FOR EGALITARIAN SPECIESISM 
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Some may agree with my objections to the argument from lack of qualities and 
the argument from potentiality, yet point out that my discussion of the former 
argument focused on the wrong qualities and that there are other qualities that 
are morally relevant and that are lacking in the early embryo. I disagree, 
however, with any approach that makes the attainment of qualities a necessary 
prerequisite for humans to have moral status. Put positively, I defend egalitarian 
speciesism or an ethic which regards all humans as equals and as having more 
value than members of any other species.  
  I shall first explain why I embrace egalitarianism. Should embryos be 
discriminated against on the basis of, for example, their inability to speak?52 No. 
It is entirely normal for embryos to be unable to speak. By doing other things, for 
example, by cell differentiation, embryos are developing features which are 
essential for the later development of speech. A one year old child cannot type, 
but it is only because it is practising its motor skills now that it will later be able 
to type. In view of the fact that they are essential for the development of the 
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more developed stages, it is arbitrary to discriminate against the less developed 
stages. Two fundamental problems are associated with deciding on a list of 
qualities which need to be fulfilled in order for a human being to acquire or 
increase in moral value. The first one is: Who is going to decide? Some people 
may value some qualities, others will value other qualities. Who should 
adjudicate between them? People like Steinbock, Tooley, Warren, and Singer 
(see below) should, by their willingness to discriminate against those humans 
that do not match their list of essential qualities, be prepared to be discriminated 
against themselves for not matching the list of qualities which others may deem 
morally relevant. They should be prepared to accept being granted less moral 
value than some other humans on the basis of someone’s judgement that, for 
example, their reasoning powers are not sufficiently developed for them to be 
granted the same moral value as people with more sophisticated reasoning 
powers. I guess this is a price these philosophers would not be willing to pay. 
They could respond, however, that what matters morally is not whether one does 
or does not have sophisticated reasoning power, but whether one does or does 
not have reasoning power (or some other quality) at all. Since embryos may not 
have reasoning power at all, they would therefore lack moral status. My reply to 
this response is that the decision to value the adult’s capacities (for example: to 
think or to feel pain) more than the embryo’s capacities (for example: to implant 
himself or herself in the womb) is entirely subjective. It is entirely normal for the 
embryo to develop the capacity to implant before she or he develops the capacity 
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to think, and the development of the latter must necessarily be preceded by the 
former, not the other way round. A second problem, related to the first, is that, 
even if a broad consensus could be established about which qualities should be 
relevant, we should still be wary of the fact that - in the words of Michael 
Zimmerman - ‘specifying groups have often defined the human in a way that 
excludes or marginalizes those who don’t belong to that group’, with horrific 
consequences (for example the consequences of Nazi Germany eugenics).53 In a 
similar vein, Stephen Schwarz has raised the charge of ‘elitism’ against those 
who make the attainment of qualities a prerequisite for a human to have moral 
status.54 Both problems are avoided by embracing egalitarianism.  
  Yet it is one thing to argue that all humans deserve equal moral significance, 
another to argue that they deserve more moral significance than nonhumans. I 
shall now explain why we need to adopt speciesism. Peter Singer has argued that 
the charge of ‘elitism’ should rather be raised against those who assign moral 
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status to humans simply because they are human and who refrain from assigning 
such status to nonhumans simply because they are nonhuman.55 This is known 
as the charge of ‘speciesism’, a concept popularised by Singer who defined it as 
‘a prejudice or attitude of bias in favor of the interests of members of one’s own 
species and against those of members of other species’.56 Singer claims to avoid 
elitism and unjustifiable discrimination by promoting the view that the 
possession of certain qualities, rather than species membership, should 
determine moral significance. My view, however, is that we need to embrace a 
speciesist ethic, and detach the concept of ‘speciesism’ from the negative 
connotations associated with the words ‘prejudice’ and ‘bias’. Egalitarian 
speciesism or an ethic which regards all humans as equals and discriminates 
against all other species is entirely reasonable. The only non-arbitrary moral 
boundary is the species boundary. Species boundaries, however, are blurry, but it 
does not take away the fact that a long time has passed, for example, since our 
ancestors stopped interbreeding with the ancestors of modern chimpanzees. 
Modern chimpanzees have many features and behaviours that are different from 
the features and behaviours of modern humans. In spite of our similarities, these 
differences are recognisable and this is why modern humans do not feel the same 
sense of community with chimpanzees as with fellow humans. This is morally 
significant. Speciesism makes good evolutionary sense. The reason why we 
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should be speciesist is because we have natural inclinations to favour members 
of our own species. Those groups of ancestral humans that cared more about 
their fellow humans than about other species had a selective advantage over 
other groups of people that put the interests of other species first or on an equal 
level. The fact that we evolved into beings with natural inclinations to care more 
for our own kind than for other species is morally significant. Mature 
chimpanzees, for example, may well have more personal qualities than human 
embryos or infants, yet they do not have the same moral significance. This is 
why, for example, the thought that we should pay money into a scheme 
benefiting chimpanzees even if it meant neglecting human children, on the basis 
of the former having more advanced qualities, provokes strong ‘gut reactions’. 
This does not deny that Darwin was wrong for rejecting the possibility that ‘any 
animal (…) performs an action for the exclusive good of another of a distinct 
species’.57 Humans can do things for other species without deriving personal 
benefit from them, or even with direct disadvantages to them. Greenpeace 
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activists have risked life and limb in their campaign to save whales. Such actions 
must be interpreted as having provocative value: they hyperbolically emphasise 
the view that whales deserve almost as much moral significance as humans, not 
that we should regularly put our lives on the line for the sake of whales. Had we 
developed into a species that routinely did things for the good of other species 
whilst compromising our own chances of survival, we would no longer exist. 
The fact that we have not become extinct indicates that we have developed, like 
other animals, natural inclinations that direct us more towards looking after our 
own kind than after other animals. It is hard to imagine how the fact that most 
people value looking after their own kind more than after other species could be 
explained without the existence of such inclinations. In this respect, Mary 
Midgley has argued that ‘there does (…) seem to be a deep emotional tendency, 
in us as in other creatures, to attend first to those around us who are like those 
who brought us up, and to take much less notice of others’, providing the 
example of large herds on the Serengeti Plain who live together yet normally 
seek primarily the company of their species members.58 The existence of this 
tendency is morally relevant, and justifies assigning more value to humans than 
to nonhumans.  
  The view that we should give preferential treatment to members of our own 
species because our biological make-up predisposes us to caring more for 
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members of our own species than for members of other species could be charged 
with committing the is-ought fallacy. This is the alleged fallacy that what we 
ought to do (the moral order) can be derived from what is (the order of being). 
The charge is that such derivation is fallacious because the order of being is held 
to be neutral towards the question of what ought to be done. David Hume is 
often credited for pointing out that such inferences are fallacious, which is why 
the fallacy is often referred to as ‘Hume’s law’. The attribution, however, is 
erroneous, as Hume himself rooted morality in being. The only point which 
Hume was trying to make is that you cannot logically derive an ‘ought’ from an 
‘ought-free’ premise. He did not make the point that the order of being is 
completely neutral to the question of what ought to be done. In fact, Hume 
thought that ‘morality is more properly felt than judg’d of’ and that we hold 
things to be ‘virtuous or vicious’ because they cause a feeling of ‘satisfaction’ or 
‘pleasure or uneasiness of a particular kind’, and that ‘our approbation is imply’d 
in the immediate pleasure’ experienced.59 Hume seems to suggest here that a 
neutral perception of reality is impossible. We are immediately affected by 
things which command either our approval or disapproval. In the words of 
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Holmes Rolston, this means that ‘an ‘ought’ is not so much derived from an ‘is’ 
as discovered simultaneously with it’.60  
  As I suggested earlier, when Steinbock writes that ‘getting enough sleep, eating 
moderately, and foregoing tobacco might be in the interest of a person who has 
no interest in following such a regime’, she seems to acknowledge that some 
things simply are in our interests because of the kind of beings that we are, and 
that this is why we ought to value them.61 Having argued that speciesism is 
based on the kind of beings that we are, I shall now argue that life is in the 
interest of embryos because of the kind of beings that they are. Embryos, like 
other humans, are constantly taking up materials from their environment and 
transporting entropy back into their environment in order to maintain and 
develop themselves as living organisms. They have a natural inclination to 
organise themselves in such a way as to stay alive and a teleological orientation 
towards growth into more developed humans, present from fertilisation. 
Gametes lack such an orientation. An early indication of the existence of a new 
individual is that shortly after fertilisation, and prior to syngamy, further sperm is 
prevented from penetrating the zona, which the ovum could not achieve by itself, 
and which is an early manifestation of the embryo’s orientation towards growth. 
Should this matter morally? As Thomas Fuchs has pointed out in his discussion 
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of active euthanasia, ‘the art of medicine traditionally consists of assisting the 
reintegration of the organism’ and ‘the ‘artificiality’ of its technical means is 
always subordinate to the preservation or restitution of the autonomous natural 
processes as far as possible’, expressed in the principle of ‘primum nil nocere’.62 
Fuchs argues that killing (as opposed to ‘letting die’ in situations where 
interventions can no longer restore the organism’s autonomous functioning) is 
incompatible with this traditional aim of medicine. Yet one could still argue that 
the killing of embryos for research purposes should become an additional aim of 
medicine. I disagree with this position because, in normal situations, promoting 
the autonomous functioning of human organisms is right, and undermining it is 
wrong. Even those people who have strong desires to end their lives also have a 
natural inclination to keep on living and it is the existence of this inclination 
which makes the decision to commit suicide never an easy option. The view - 
expressed by Timothy Sprigge - that we have ‘sentiments about killing which 
cannot be reduced to judgements about what will best promote the sum of 
human happiness’ suggests that the existence of this natural drive to maintain 
life is morally relevant.63 The basic reason why the protection of human life 
should be a precious value is not that we are beings who consciously decide that 
life is better than death (as we may not), but that we find ourselves to be 
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organisms that strive to maintain life. The prima facie wrongness of killing 
humans consists in the termination of the autonomous functioning of human 
organisms, which is present from fertilisation. Egalitarian speciesism is the view 
that all humans have equal rights to life (as they all strive to maintain it) and that 
they have more value than nonhumans.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Legal advisory bodies in the UK have argued for embryo research and the view 
that  early embryos are less valuable than other humans on the basis of the views 
that they lack relevant qualities and only have a potentiality to become humans 
with moral status. Among the qualities which are considered important for a 
being to have moral status are the capacities to ‘think, act, and communicate’, as 
well as a capacity to feel pain. Especially the latter has been the subject of debate 
in the ethics literature. To engage with this debate, I presented the position of 
Bonnie Steinbock as a putative defence of present UK legislation. I have shown 
that neither the UK legal advisory bodies’ nor her account are convincing. 
Subsequently, I discussed four different versions of the argument from lack of 
potentiality, all of which can be found in the legal advisory bodies’ documents: 
that the early embryo is potentially human; that he or she is a potential human 
individual; that he or she has a passive potentiality to become a human with 
moral status; and that he or she has an active potentiality to become a human 
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with moral status. I have shown that none of these are convincing. In the final 
section, I presented a case for egalitarian speciesism. Embryos have moral status 
and should be assigned more value than nonhuman beings as they are 
autonomously functioning organisms with a teleological orientation towards 
becoming more developed humans from the beginning of fertilisation. Current 
UK legislation on embryo research is immoral as it undermines egalitarianism 
by discriminating against early embryos. 
